DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS:
CONFINING THE EXAMINER TO ONE HAT
[A] fair trial by an unbiased and non-partisan trier of the facts is
of the essence of the adjudicatory process as well when the judging
is done in an administrative proceeding by an administrative 'functionary as when it is done in a court by a judge.'
While sifting through the day's mail, a stockbroker may come
across an envelope bearing the insignia of the New Jersey Bureau of
Securities. 2 Upon opening it, he discovers that he has been subpoenaed
by the Bureau Chief for the purpose of interrogation and investigation.A
1 NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1943).
2 The Bureau of Securities implements the Uniform Securities Law in New Jersey.
In addition to New Jersey, fifteen other states as well as the territory of Puerto Rico
have adopted it. They include: ALA. CODE tit. 53, §§ 28 et seq. (Supp. 1960); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 45.55.010 et seq. (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1240 et seq. (1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§§ 485-1 et seq. (1968) (does not contain an investigation provision); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
17-1252 et seq. (1964); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 51.701 et seq. (1965) (does not contain an investigation provision); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 13 et seq. (Supp. 1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 451.501 et seq. (Supp. 1956); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 409.101 et seq. (Supp. 1952); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 71, §§ 1 et seq. (1965); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 851 et seq. (Supp. 1963); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 62-1 et seq. (Supp. 1962); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 et seq. (1968) (empowering
the commission as a whole to investigate and adjudicate); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.005
et seq. (1961); WIs. STAT. §§ 551.01 et seq. (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-117.1 et seq.
(1965).
3 The Chief of the Bureau of Securities has discretion to investigate and subpoena
witnesses pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-68 (1970), which provides:
(a) The bureau chief in his discretion (1) may make such private investigations within or outside of this State as he deems necessary to determine whether
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this law or any
rule or order hereunder, or to aid in the enforcement of this law or in the
prescribing of rules and forms hereunder, (2) may require or permit any person
to file a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as the bureau chief determines, as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated, and (3) may publish information concerning any violation of this act or
any rule or order hereunder, provided that there shall be no publication until
such rule or order becomes effective;
(b) For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this law, the
bureau chief or any officer designated by him may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence and require
the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, agreements or
other documents or records which the bureau chief deems relevant or material
to the inquiry;
(c) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to, any
person, the Superior Court, upon application by the bureau chief, may issue to
the person an order requiring him to appear before the bureau chief, or the
officer designated by him, there to produce documentary evidence if so ordered
or to give evidence touching the matter under investigation or in question. The
court may grant injunctive relief restraining the issuance, sale or offer for sale,
purchase or offer to purchase, promotion, negotiation, advertisement or distribution from or within this State of any securities by a person, or agent, employee,
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On the scheduled day the broker presents himself before the Chief, and
is informed that he is under investigation for possible violations of New
Jersey's Blue Sky laws.4 The Chief then initiates the investigation by
questioning the stockbroker in an effort to determine whether there is
any substance to the suspicions. Upon completion the broker is advised
that he will be notified of any further action.
Some time later the stockbroker may again be confronted with the
now ominous emblem of the Bureau of Securities. A removal of the
contents of the envelope reveals numerous preliminary findings of facts,
the fruit of the Bureau Chief's investigations, and a Proposed Order,
signed by the Chief, revoking his broker-dealer registration., Unsure
broker, partner, officer, director or stockholder thereof, until such person has
fully complied with such subpoena and the bureau has completed its investigation. The court may proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwise;
(d) No person is excused from attending and testifying or from producing
any document or record before the bureau or in obedience to the subpoena of
the bureau chief or any officer designated by him, or in any proceeding instituted
by the bureau, on the ground that the testimony or evidence (documentary or
otherwise) required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture; but no individual may be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after claiming his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence (documentary or otherwise), except that
the individual testifying is not exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in testifying.
(e) When it shall appear to the bureau chief that the testimony of any person is essential to an investigation instituted by him as provided by this chapter,
and that the failure of such person to appear and testify may defeat the proper
and effective conduct thereof, the bureau chief, in addition to the other remedies
provided for herein, may, by petition verified generally, setting forth the facts,
apply to the Superior Court for a writ of ne exeat against such person. The
court shall thereupon direct the issuance of the writ against such person requiring him to give sufficient bail conditioned to insure his appearance before the
bureau chief for examination under oath in such investigation and that he will
continue his appearance therein from time to time until the completion of the
investigation and will appear before the court if the bureau chief shall institute
any proceeding therein as a result of his investigation.
The court shall cause to be indorsed on the writ of ne exeat, in words at
length, a suitable amount of bail upon which the person named in the writ
shall be freed, having a due regard to the nature of the case and the value of
the securities involved. All applications to be freed on bail shall be on notice
to the bureau chief and the sufficiency of the bail given on the writ shall be approved by the court. All recognizances shall be to the State and all forfeitures
thereof shall be declared by the court. The proceeds of the forfeitures shall be
paid into the State treasury. (emphasis added).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:3-47 et seq. (1970).
5 When the Bureau Chief completes his investigation he plays the role of a grand
jury by making preliminary findings of facts. As prosecutor, he issues a Proposed Order
of Revocation pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-58(c)(2) (1970), which provides:
(2) When the bureau chief finds that a registration should be suspended
or revoked he may enter a proposed order to suspend or revoke such registration
and he shall promptly notify the registrant, as well as the employer if the registrant is an agent, of the proposed order, of the reasons therefor and that the
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of the exact import of this latest communication, but totally cognizant
of the consequences attendant to a revocation of his registration, the
broker, through his attorney, requests a hearing before the Bureau. 6
On the hearing day, an inquiry as to the examiner's identity discloses that the Chief will serve as judge. 7 Objections that it is unfair for
the same person who has investigated and prosecuted a case to also act
as judge go for naught. The Bureau Chief may agree with the broker,
but, notwithstanding, he can refuse to disqualify himself since he is
permitted by New Jersey law to exercise these functions.
Convinced that those sections of the Uniform Securities Law,
which sanction such seemingly incompatible roles are unconstitutional,
the stockbroker may decide to challenge it. He reasons that such a situation works an obvious injustice on many persons. For example, it places
an unnecessary and unfair temptation before the Bureau Chief to determine that his investigation was successful. More importantly, it subjects
the broker to a hearing before a possibly predisposed tribunal, apparently contravening a basic right secured by the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.
The stockbroker in this hypothetical situation is entitled to the
rudimentary requirements of due process and fair play since he is
involved in an administrative hearing of a quasi-judicial nature.9 One
matter will be set down for hearing if a written request for such hearing is filed
with the bureau chief within 10 days after receipt of such notice by the registrant. If no hearing is requested within the specified time the bureau chief shall
enter the proposed order as a final order, which shall be effective when entered.
If a hearing is held the bureau chief shall withdraw the proposed order or enter
a final order in accord with the findings at the hearing, which order shall be
effective when entered. (emphasis added).
6 By statute, all parties in a contested case are entitled to a hearing after reasonable
notice. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-9 (1970).
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-58(a) (1970) provides in part:
(a) The bureau chief may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any registration if he finds (1) that the order is in the public interest and (2) that the applicant or registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment advisor, any
partner, officer, or director, any person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling the brokerdealer or investment advisor . . . . (emphasis added).
See Higgins v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 100 N.J. Super. 266, 241 A.2d 660 (App. Div.
1968), where the Bureau Chief acted as investigator, prosecutor and judge.
8 The Uniform Securities Law was drafted in 1956 after two years of intensive study.
Its principal architects were Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School and Edward
M. Cowett. See 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 84 (1957). It was adopted in New Jersey
in 1967; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:3-47 et seq. (1970).
9 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1938):
[I]n administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play. These demand "a fair and open hearing,"---essential alike to the legal valid-
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of the most fundamental of all due process guarantees is a fair trial
conducted by an impartial tribunal. This right is so deeply engrained
in our jurisprudence that even where a mere "probability of unfairness"
exists, due process is denied. 10
Although the Uniform Securities Law provides the classic example,
it is merely part of an overall administrative due process problem in
New Jersey, since this state's case law sanctions such a merger of functions and its Administrative Procedure Act fails to prohibit it.
NEW JERSEY'S POSITION

In an early case," three members of an investigative committee
were permitted to sit as part of a tribunal deciding the very case they
had investigated. The court reasoned that in the absence of a personal interest there could be no disqualification. But some years later
it was held that a liquor license could not be revoked by a tribunal
which included members who had served as witnesses for the agency
in that case. 1 2 Apparently, fundamental fairness is breached only when
the investigator-prosecutor-judge attempts to assume the additional role
of witness.
In New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. Nemitz, 13 defendant's
license was revoked by the Board of Optometrists. One member of the
hearing tribunal had caused the investigation to be made, procured the
investigator, and provided funds for it. On appeal, the court held that
the defendant was denied a fair hearing. 14 It predicated its decision
ity of the administrative regulation and to the maintenance of public confidence
in the value and soundness of this important governmental process.
Accord, Juzek v. Hackensack Water Co., 48 N.J. 302, 314, 225 A.2d 335, 341 (1966); Mazza
v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 516, 105 A.2d 545, 555 (1954).
10 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (held to be a denial of due process for
the same judge who had ordered defendant to appear in court to show cause why he
should not be punished for criminal contempt, to then preside at the contempt trial);
accord, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927); Van Sweringen v. Van Sweringen, 22 N.J. 440, 126 A.2d 334 (1956).
11 Reimer v. Freeholders of Essex, 96 N.J.L. 371, 115 A. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd,
97 N.J.L. 575, 117 A. 926 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922).
12 Drozdowski v. Sayreville, 133 N.J.L. 536, 45 A.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
Is 21 N.J. Super. 18, 90 A.2d 740 (App. Div. 1952).
14 The Nemitz court demonstrated its awareness of the basic problem of many administrative agencies, viz., that the functions of investigation, prosecution and adjudication are within their general powers. It said:
[Where the investigation, prosecution and judicial functions repose in the same
board, its members must be zealous in the recognition and preservation of the
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upon the intense personal interest manifested by that member toward
the defendant's activities. Nevertheless, the court, albeit by dictum,
noted the danger of potentially prejudiced tribunals resulting from the
repose of investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers within
a single administrative agency. A fortiori, the merging of functions
within a single person would seem to exacerbate this risk.
In Mackler v. Board of Education of City of Camden,15 this precise
issue arose. The Board appointed a committee composed of three of
its members to investigate the plaintiff. An investigation was conducted
and, when completed, formal charges were filed by two members of
the three-man investigatory commission. The court refused to disqualify these men from sitting as judges in the case. Distinguishing
Nemitz, it differentiated between complaints made where there was a
showing of personal interest from those made as a mere "formality of
office."' 6 In short, the court concluded that absent a showing of personal interest, prior contacts as investigator and prosecutor are not
sufficient grounds for barring participation as judge.
In the sphere of decisional law it is now firmly established that
right to hearing by impartial triers of the facts and the courts must impose a
most careful supervision of that element of the hearing.
21 N.J. Super. at 37, 90 A.2d at 750.
Generally, if a judge or hearing examiner has a focused bias in advance of the hearing he will be disqualified. For a general discussion of this proposition, see Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Berkshire
Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941); Johnson v. Michigan Milk Mktg.
Bd., 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940); Comment, Disqualification of Administrative
Officials for Bias, 13 VAND. L. REv. 712 (1960). See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE
LAW TRFATISE §§ 12.01 et seq. (1958).
15 16 N.J. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954).
16 The court said:

The making of a complaint does not disqualify a board member where its
making is a formality of office and no personal interest is shown.
Id. at 367-68, 108 A.2d at 856-57.
See Kramer v. Board of Adjust., 45 N.J. 268, 212 A.2d 153 (1965) (holding certain
members of the Board of Adjustment not to be disqualified even though they indorsed
the mayor's support for a zoning variance which they were to decide upon); Hoek v.
Board of Educ., 75 N.J. Super. 182, 182 A.2d 577 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 38 N.J. 497, 185
A.2d 869 (1962) (where the court found personal ill will as a ground for disqualification,
but saw nothing improper with the prior investigation and subsequent filing of charges
by the board member); Connelly v. Jersey City Housing Auth., 63 N.J. Super. 424, 164
A.2d 806 (App. Div. 1960) (discussing the functioning of commissioners under the Veterans
Tenure Act as judge, jury and witness, the court noted the patent danger in such situations, but concluded that the Legislature allowed for no alternative); Robertson v. Newcomb, 27 N.J. Super. 314, 99 A.2d 361 (App. Div. 1953) (where defendant charged plaintiff
with incompetency and discrimination and then sat as judge in the hearing on the charges,
the court dismissed the complaint on other grounds). See also In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super.
564, 574, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (App. Div. 1952) (concurring opinion).
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an administrative determination must be based exclusively on the record
as adduced at the hearing.1 7 As the supreme court in Mazza v. Cavicchia
stated:
In any proceeding that is judicial in nature, whether in a court or
in an administrative agency, the process of decision must be governed by the basic principle of the exclusiveness of the record.
"Where a hearing is prescribed by statute, nothing must be taken
into account by the administrative tribunal in arriving at its determination that has not been introduced in some manner into the
record of the hearing." . . . Unless this principle is observed, the
right to a hearing itself becomes meaningless. Of what real worth
is the right to present evidence and to argue its significance at a
formal hearing, if the one who decides the case may stray at will
from the record in reaching his decision?18
Although this decision was not made with a view to the procedures
discussed herein, it nevertheless has application. Even if a hearing examiner discloses for the record the investigations he has made and the
conclusions derived, a complete disclosure is virtually unachievable.
In the first place, it is doubtful whether all the facts and conclusions
gleaned from his investigation can be recalled with exactness. Second,
the impossibility of recognizing the influences on his subconscious
precludes their incorporation into the record.
Juxtaposing Mazza with the preceding cases highlights an apparent
philosophical inconsistency-the spirit of fairness so evident in Mazza
is curiously absent from the others.
Some New Jersey administrative agencies have striven to avoid the
merger of functions. The Division of Professional Boards, for example,
maintains a separate Bureau of Inspectors which conducts most of the
investigations for the professional agencies, thus insulating the hearing
examiner from that phase of the case.' 9
Concern for this problem is also evidenced by the legislative history
of New Jersey's present Administrative Procedure Act.2" Between 1948
17 Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954). The majority opinion in
Mazza is critically discussed in 2 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.09 (1958),

and, by the same author, in New Jersey's Unique Conception of "Fair Play" in the Administrative Process, 10 RUTcrS L. REv. 660 (1956). See also W. GFLLHORN & C. BYSE,
ArMINISTRATVE LAW

1063-73 (4th ed. 1960).

18 15 N.J. 498, 514, 105 A.2d 545, 554 (1954).
19 Author's interview with Herman C. Litwack, Secretary-Director of the State
Board of Architects, and with Stephen F. Bonora, Chief Inspector of the Bureau of Inspectors, on November 18, 1970. See also N.J. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Furman, 33 N.J.

121, 162 A.2d 839 (1960).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14B-1 et seq. (1970). Unfortunately, while predecessors of
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and 1961 comprehensive administrative procedure acts were proposed
in the New Jersey Legislature. The first of these proposals would have
established a new procedure for governing the judicial functions of
administrative agencies. 21 The hearing and initial decision of all contested cases would have been taken from the agencies themselves and
reposed in a body of independent hearing commissioners assigned to
them, as needed, by the president of the Civil Service Commission.
This proposal met resistance at the public hearing on the bill.
Opponents contended that it placed an undue amount of discretion in
the president of the Commission and, furthermore, that it would be
ludicrous to assign hearings to laymen not specially qualified in the
area. 22 Nevertheless, even foes of the bill recognized the justified resentment against administrative procedures which permitted the same person in the same case to act as investigator, prosecutor and judge. As one
opponent stated:
Admittedly, the resentment against the administrative agency procedure, whereby investigator, prosecutor and judge may be the
same person ...

is to [sic] widespread that, regardless of the merits

in certain instances of such a setup, there should be a change at
least with respect to the enforcement agencies .... 23
As a result of the public hearing, a committee substitute to the
bill was introduced, which attempted to satisfy the criticism that hearing
commissioners must be experts. No hearing, however, was held on the
substitute and it died in the Senate. In 1952, a similar bill was intro24
duced, but it too met the same fate.
In 1954, an administrative procedure act was prepared by a Special
Committee on Administrative Law for the New Jersey State Bar Association. The Committee was composed of experts in the field who wrote
and reviewed their draft with exhaustive thoroughness. The fruit of
their labor contained a provision prohibiting the very procedure permitted by New Jersey case law and sanctioned by the Uniform Securities
Law. Section 20 of the proposed act provided:
No person shall be designated a hearer who was engaged in investigative or prosecuting junctions for the agency in the particular
this Act proscribed the
not.
21 N.J. Senate Bill
22 Public Hearing
23 Id. at 34.
24 N.J. Senate Bill

alliance of investigator, prosecutor and judge, the current Act does
21, J 31 (1948).
On Senate Bill No. 21 (1948).
48 (1952).
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matter being heard. The function of all such presiding officers
shall be conducted in an impartial manner. 25
It is highly significant that this committee of specialists, in discarding the establishment of an independent body of hearers suggested in
the 1948 and 1952 bills, nevertheless retained the concept of divorcing
the investigative and prosecutorial aspects of a case from the decisional
phase.
This proposed act was viewed as an effort to unify the procedure
and practice before all agencies as well as adopt "a set of minimum
standards of fair procedure below which no agency may fall."2
Introduced as a bill in 1955, this proposal died in judicial committee. 27
A prominent reason for the present Act's failure to adopt the same
or similar provision suggested by its predecessors was the concern among
various state agencies that such a provision would not only restrict their
powers, but also require a reorganization of their structures. 28 Such
reasoning, however, has not impeded courts in the past where the due
process rights of a licensee were in jeopardy. 29 No one has attacked the
logic inherent in preventing the same person who has investigated and
prosecuted a case from serving as judge in it. Indeed, the salutary features of such a procedure have been recognized by many legislators
and experts; the same provision regarding the separation of investigative and prosecutorial functions from those of adjudication may be
found in all administrative procedure acts introduced in New Jersey
between 1955 and 1961.80
THE VIEW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Other jurisdictions have provided for various agency structures
designed to avoid the results sanctioned in New Jersey.
Consistent with its reputation as a progressive jurisdiction, California has implemented an enlightened approach to administrative quasijudicial hearings.8 1 Its Administrative Procedure Act provides for
25 77 N.J.L.J. 413, 418 (1954) (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 413.

27
28
29
go
(1958);
(1960);

N.J. Senate Bill 277 (1955).
89 N.J.L.J. 714 (1966).
See Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954).
N.J. Senate Bill 42 (1956); N.J. Assembly Bill 515 (1957); N.J. Assembly Bill 338
N.J. Senate Bill 34 (1958); N.J. Assembly Bill 240 (1959); N.J. Assembly Bill 176
and N.J. Assembly Bill 144 (1961).
31 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11502 (1966):
All hearings of state agencies required to be conducted under this chapter shall
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an independent body of hearing examiners, thus assuring the fairness
of the hearing by separating the investigatory and accusatory aspects of
a case from its adjudication. 32 This procedure evidences an overall
consciousness that administrative hearings must comply with the requirements of procedural due process; that to meet this requirement
the adjudicatory tribunal must be impartial; and that to assure this
impartiality it is imperative that the hearer play no part in either the
investigation or prosecution of a case in which he intends to act as
33
judge.
Other jurisdictions also prohibit any person from taking part in
the decision of a case which he has investigated or prosecuted. A recent
Pennsylvania case disqualified an individual from a commission
reviewing an agency decision where that person had instituted the action
by his complaint. 34 A somewhat earlier Connecticut decision reached
a similar conclusion, prohibiting two members of an adjudicatory tribunal from functioning as judges in the same case they had investigated. 35 Both courts believed that the mere fact no actual bias on the
part of the examiner had been shown was immaterial. As the Connecticut court stated:
Such investigation might well lead them to approach the hearing
with a preconceived idea of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
[The accused] would, very likely, be placed in the position of
having to overcome, by evidence he might produce, this idea. 36
be conducted by hearing officers on the staff of the Office of Administrative Procedure. The presiding officer of the Office of Administrative Procedure has power
to appoint a staff of hearing officers for the office as provided in Section 11370.3
of the Government Code. Each hearing officer shall have been admitted to practice law in this State for at least five years immediately preceding his appointment and shall possess any additional qualifications established by the State
Personnel Board for the particular class of position involved.
32 Kuchman, The Role of the Hearing Officer, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 212, 213 (1956). This
article criticizes California's approach; it recognizes the salutary features of the statute,
but questions its application in California.
3a See also Nevada's Administrative Procedure Act, NEv. REV. STAT. § 233B.122 (1967),
which provides:
No agency member who acts as an investigator or prosecutor in any contested
case may take any part in the adjudication of such case.
See generally Lakusta, Operations in an Agency Not Subject to the APA: Public Utilities
Commission, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 218 (1956). This article traces the history of California's
Administrative Procedure Act. It notes that California has a body of full-time hearing
examiners and reviews their qualifications and compensation, the method of their assignment, the conduct of the hearing, and the decisional process.
34 Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
35 Reardon v. Dental Comm'n, 128 Conn. 116, 20 A.2d 622 (1941).
36 Id. at 119, 20 A.2d at 623-24. Accord, Nider v. Homan, 89 P.2d 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1939) (a commissioner who filed charges against a physician was disqualified from
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THE PRACTICE ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL

FederalAdministrative ProcedureAct and Federal Case Law
The defects of New Jersey's judicial position and its Securities
Law are glaringly illustrated when compared with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 37 and federal case law.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides for what is
termed an "internal separation of functions". The investigation, prosecution and adjudication of a case are carried on under the auspices of
a particular agency, but within that agency investigation and prosecution are kept separate from adjudication. The Act provides:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that
or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review ....

counsel in public proceedings.38

except as witness or

The disuniting of roles was designed to prevent the "ominous
spectre of judge-jury-prosecutor, rolled into one,"39 thereby assuring an
impartial hearing in accord with the traditions of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 40 The legislative intent is unmistakably clear in the following language:

I]hose persons who engage in the activities of investigation or
sitting as a member of the commission designated to try the charges); Sandahl v. City of
Des Moines, 227 Iowa 1310, 290 N.W. 697 (1940) (holding that a municipal civil service
employee was denied a fair and impartial tribunal where some of its members had investigated and filed charges against him); People ex rel. Miller v. Elmdorf, 51 App. Div.
173, 64 N.Y.S. 775 (1900) (reinstating a policeman due to an unfair hearing resulting
from the mayor's role of investigator, prosecutor and judge); Hanna v. Board of Aldermen, 54 R.I. 392, 173 A. 358 (1934) (in a proceeding to remove the chief of police for
dereliction of duty, those members of the board of aldermen who had preferred the
charges were disqualified from acting as triers at the hearing); State ex rel. Ball v.
McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959) (characterizing as highly improper the
conduct of the hearing tribunal member who served as counsel for the complainant).
Compare State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942).
Contra, Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 Cal. 2d 93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1964);
State ex rel. Yuhas v. Board of Med. Exam., 135 Mont. 381, 339 P.2d 981 (1959);
Seidenberg v. New Mexico Bd. of Med. Exam., 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469 (1969).
37 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (Supp. III, 1967).
88 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (Supp. III, 1967); see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE
§ 13.06 (1958); W. GELLHORN c C. BysE, ADMINIMSTATIVE LAW 944 (4th ed. 1960).
39 Brown, The Office of Administrative Hearings, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 462 (1944);
cf. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 59 A.B.A. REP. 539 (1934).
40 Smith, Improving the Administration of Justice in Administrative Processes, 30
A.B.A.J. 127 (1944). See also N. VOGEL, ADMINInSRATIVE AGENCIES IN NEW JERSEY 75-76
(1941).
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advocacy should be segregated from those who engage in the activity of judging... 41

Attempts by federal agencies to empower a single individual with
these various functions have been held to deny due process. 42 The
leading case of Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC 43 involved the revocation of a
broker-dealer's securities license, a penalty which could be imposed
under the New Jersey Securities Law. 44 Nevertheless, the decision

reached in Amos Treat is hostile to the practice legitimated by the Uniform Securities Law.
In Amos Treat, the SEC had commenced a public hearing to determine whether the plaintiff's broker-dealer registration should be revoked. The investigation had been carried on by the Division of
Corporate Finance, headed by Manuel F. Cohen. When Cohen at-

tempted to participate as judge in the revocation proceedings, the firm
sought to disqualify him. The court agreed with those efforts, finding

a denial of due process:
We are unable to accept the view that a member of an investiga'tive or prosecuting staff may initiate an investigation, weigh its results, perhaps then recommend the filing of charges, and thereafter
become a member of that commission or agency, participate in adjudicatory proceedings, join in commission or agency rulings and
ultimately pass upon the possible amenability of the respondents
to the administrative orders of the commission or agency. So to
hold, in our view, would be tantamount to that denial of adminis41 Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 589,
600-01 (1941); accord, The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,41 COLUM. L. REv. 585 (1941); U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD. NEWS 1195 (1946):
[T]he same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This not
only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness.
Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion
of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in
the role of prosecutor, presented to itself. (emphasis added).
42 Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 589-92 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162, 170 (9th Cir. 1967); R.A.
Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967);
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Citta v. Delaware Valley
Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 309
F. Supp. 785, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 296 F. Supp. 1259,
1263 (S.D. Fla. 1969), modified, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), all of which recognize that
the minimum standards of due process dictate that no person who has investigated and
prosecuted a case can take part in its adjudication because the legal rights and livelihood
of the defendant are at stake. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 US. 420, 442 (1960).
48 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-58 (1970).
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against which both the Congress and the courts
trative due process
45
have inveighed.
In one instance, the right to be judged by a person other than an
investigator has been held to be of greater value than the right to be
represented by counsel. In Wasson v. Trowbridge,46 the petitioner, along
with a group of other cadets, had thrown a fellow student into Long
Island Sound. At a disciplinary hearing scheduled to decide whether
he should be expelled, some of the same persons who had investigated
the charges attempted to act as judges. The court held that while due
process did not require representation by counsel at such a hearing,
it did require an impartial trier of the facts.
It is too clear to require argument or citation that a fair hearing
presupposes an impartial trier of fact and that prior official involvement in a case renders impartiality most difficult to main47
tain.
306 F.2d at 266-67; see Maremont Corp. v. FTC, 431 F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir. 1970).
382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
47 Id. at 813; accord, Camero v. United States, 375 F.2d 777 (Ct. Cl. 1967); National
Biscuit Co., 21 AD. L.2d 1021 (FTC 1967); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 764 (D.C.
Cir.) (Washington, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated and remanded,
381 U.S. 739 (1965), where the court observed:
A fair hearing is denied . . . [when] an adjudicator has taken a position apparently inconsistent with an ability to judge the facts fairly, subsequent protestations of open-mindedness on his part cannot restore a presumption of impartiality.
Whether justice was in fact done is not the issue; an administrative hearing "must
be attended, not only with every element of fairness but with the very appearance
of complete fairness." We must presume that a fair hearing was denied if a disinterested observer would have reason to believe that the Commissioner had "in
some measure adjudged the facts * of a particular case in advance of hearing
it."
For further discussion of the problem and its solution on the federal level, see Pangburn
v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962); Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.
1958); McBride v. Roland, 248 F. Supp. 459, 466 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 369 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1966).
Contra, Levers v. Berkshire, 159 F.2d 689, 693 (10th Cir. 1947); Converse v. Udall, 262 F.
Supp. 583 (D. Ore. 1966). Cf. Phillips v. SEC, 153 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
860 (1946). A special exception to the general federal view is the policy followed in excluding or expelling aliens. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), the Supreme
Court held that one person could not provide investigation for and preside over a
deportation proceeding. Congress answered the Supreme Court with the McCarran-Walter
Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1964), which, in effect, permits such merging of functions
in exclusion and deportation proceedings. Finally, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302
(1955), the Supreme Court held that an alien was not denied due process even though the
hearing examiner was supervised and controlled by persons who had performed investigative and prosecutorial functions in that case. There was, however, a strong dissent by
Justices Black and Frankfurter who emphasized the inherent due process problems. See
generally Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex tel. Catalano v. Shaughnessy, 197 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1952);
Reynolds v. United States, 68 F.2d 346 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 679 (1934).
45
46
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The preceding review of decisions, along with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, clearly demonstrate a well-reasoned approach
to a serious situation. The virtually unanimous condemnation of the
merger of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the
same person renders New Jersey's position inscrutable as well as potentially unconstitutional.
Organization and Procedure of Some FederalAgencies
Persuasive precedent exists in the organization of and procedures
established by some federal agencies since they do not attempt to combine in the same person the functions of investigator, prosecutor and
judge. Organizational dividing lines of these agencies serve to illustrate
48
this point.
Because the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New
Jersey Bureau of Securities regulate similar activities, they necessarily
adjudicate similar controversies. Nevertheless, the SEC maintains a
separate body of hearing examiners, 49 each of whom is appointed by the
Commission and serves independently of the interested division or
office. This structure assures an impartial tribunal and has been an
effective safeguard of procedural due process which licensees at a
quasi-judicial administrative hearing have a right to expect. 50
The Federal Communications Commission also has a body of hearing examiners which is responsible for hearing all adjudicatory cases
48 W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1018-19 (4th ed. 1960).

17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (1970).
SEC, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 19 (1969). The
following is an organization chart of the SEC. Note the separate body of Hearing
Examiners:
49
50
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"designated for any evidentiary adjudicatory hearing." 51 Their
objectivity and impartiality are guaranteed, since any employee assigned
to hear a case "shall not be responsible to or subject to the supervision
or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency.' '52
The organization and procedure of other federal agencies exemplify
the rigid adherence on the federal level to the principle of internal
separation of functions.53 Thus, the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act and the internal structure of many federal agencies have obviated
the likelihood that prejudicial commitments or prosecutorial zeal will
ever conflict with adjudicatory responsibility.
SOLUTIONS AND

CONCLUSION

While discussion has centered about New Jersey's statutory and case
law which permit the merger of inconsistent functions in quasi-judicial
proceedings, it should be noted that the Uniform Securities Law has
also been adopted in fifteen other states. 54 Since some or all of these
states can fall victim to the very evils existent in New Jersey, the
solutions offered in this comment can be utilized by them.
For various reasons, some known and others unknowable, New Jersey has chosen to be less protective than other jurisdictions in delineating the due process rights of a licensee in a quasi-judicial proceeding.
While allowing hearing examiners to become involved in any other aspects of a proceeding has been scorned at the federal level and by several
states, absent a showing of personal interest New Jersey will tolerate it.
New Jersey's posture falls short of the minimum standards adhered
to by other jurisdictions in a number of ways. Irrespective of the absence
or presence of a personal interest, the preconceived ideas necessarily
formed by an investigator's or prosecutor's prior contacts with a case
must preclude him from subsequently taking any part in its adjudication. The overriding goal must not only be a just resolution of controversies, but also the maintenance of an appearance of justice in
achieving that end.
5147 C.F.R. § 0.151 (1970).
52 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(8) (Supp. 1970). See also the structure of the Federal Maritime

Commission in the UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL

1969-1970, at 615

(1970). In particular, note 46 C.F.R. §§ 502.145, 502.284 (1970), which establish a separation
between investigation and adjudication.
53 See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1969-1970, at 590-634 (1970).
54 See note 2 supra.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:398

The segregation of roles, moreover, would not only avert the type
of situation inveighed against by the fundamental concept of due
process, but would also adhere to the deeply engrained tradition of
Anglo-American jurisprudence that "no man shall be a judge in his
55
own case."
Aside from the more obvious "probability of unfairness," there
are some subtle exposures to injustice. Since appellate tribunals accord
more deference to an administrative determination than the decision
of a trial court, the likelihood that an aggrieved licensee would obtain
judicial relief is remote. 56 Furthermore, the very informality of administrative hearings, coupled with the broad discretion vested in the hearing examiner, facilitates the imposition of a prejudicial decision.57
There are additional practical considerations. Abolishing the asserted infirmity at the hearing stage would remove a ground for judicial
review, thus reducing the oppressive case load of our appellate courts. In
addition, by maintaining an appearance of justice a basis for assailing
our administrative agencies will be removed.
The fact that timeworn practices would have to be altered cannot
be an adequate reason for depriving a person of his due process rights.
Certainly the avoidance of a conscious or subconscious bias must prevail over speculative fears that the necessary reorganization will adversely affect efficient management of any agency.
There are a number of solutions to this problem. An Administrative Court, functioning similar to a Tax Court or Court of Claims, can
be established. While this tribunal would be the forum for all quasijudicial administrative proceedings, it would be independent of the
agencies. 58 However, the creation of such an Administrative Court could
impair the expertise of the judge, since he would exercise only adjudicatory responsibilities and would not possess the overall personal regulatory experience needed to fully comprehend the technical questions
55 Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
56 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); accord, NLRB v. James
Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1953); Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589,
598-99, 210 A.2d 753, 758 (1965); Mead Johnson & Co. v. South Plainfield, 95 N.J. Super.
455, 466, 231 A.2d 816, 821 (App. Div. 1967).
57 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10 (1970); NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562, 563 (5th
Cir. 1943) (noting that administrative tribunals should be more impartial than judicial
tribunals, since many safeguards have been removed from administrative quasi-judicial
hearings).
58 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960); see Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol,
40 CONELL L.Q. 281 (1955).
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before him, nor would he have "the benefit of the combined judgment
and experience of the [administrative] staff." 59
Another solution, the creation of a separate body of hearing examiners, has been adopted by California and was proposed in 1948 and
1952 in New Jersey.60 The expertise problem, however, is equally compelling here. Moreover, since there are over three hundred agencies in
New Jersey,61 a large new office would be required to meet their adjudicatory responsibilities, causing an additional drain on the already overburdened state treasury.
The most viable solution is to provide for an internal separation of
functions. This result could be achieved by means of a statute such as
the following:
No administrative agency member who acts as an investigator or
prosecutor in a contested case may take any part in the decision
making of that case.
Such a simple provision can be inserted as an amendment to the New
Jersey Administrative Procedure Act. Or, the Director of the Division
of Administrative Procedure can establish this provision as an essential
to the conduct of hearings pursuant to the power vested in him by
statute.6 2 This solution does not fall prey to any of the pitfalls in the
preceding alternatives. The expertise of the hearer will not be sacrificed,
since he will be able to rely on his regulatory experience when adjudicating a case. That a new office will not be required avoids the fiscal
problem.
Even though some agencies have seen fit to impose this separation
upon themselves, others have not. Furthermore, agencies are bound
neither by statute nor case law to adhere to such a segregation. Legislative fiat or judicial decision is therefore needed to formalize the practice followed by some New Jersey agencies while compelling others to
adopt this new approach. The "probability of unfairness" arising from
the merger of functions was recognized and removed by Congress in
1946.63 Nevertheless, the Uniform Securities Law, New Jersey's case
59 Cary, Why I Oppose the Divorce of the Judicial Function from Federal Regulatory
Agencies, 51 A.B.A.J. 33, 37 (1965); cf. Nathanson, Separation of Functions Within Federal
Administrative Agencies, 35 ILL. L. REv. 901 (1941); Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the
Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. Hector, 69 YALE L.J. 965 (1960); Smith, Improving
the Administration of Justice in Administrative Processes, 30 A.B.A.J. 127 (1944).
60 See notes 21, 24, 31 supra.
61 Author's Communication with Melvin Mounts, New Jersey's Administrative Rules
Analyst, November 18, 1970.
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-6(e)(8) (1970).
63 See note 37 supra.
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law 4 and its Administrative Procedure Act have failed to prohibit such
inconsistent roles. So long as the "probability of unfairness" exists, due
process is being denied.
The provisions of the Uniform Securities Law which sanction such
unfair practices can be stricken or amended to remedy its deficiency.
By amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act or appropriate
action by the Director of the Division of Administrative Procedure,
however, the "probability of unfairness" will be removed from the
proceedings before all New Jersey administrative agencies. Only by
confining the examiner to one hat will New Jersey possess an Administrative Procedure Act which can be truly hailed as a "great stride
65
forward" in the field of administrative law.

Ronald J. Riccio
64 As a precursor to reform, a recent unreported chancery decision, F.S. Donahue,
Santo & Co. v. Krupsky, C-843-70 (N.J. Ch., Feb. 11, 1971), permanently enjoined the Chief
of the New Jersey Bureau of Securities from hearing, deciding, or imposing a penalty in a
case which he had investigated and prosecuted. While the court found that resolution of the
controversy did not require a decision as to the constitutionality of the Uniform Securities
Law, it strongly condemned agency practices which permit a hearing examiner to decide
a case in which he has had prior contacts as an investigator or prosecutor. This is the
first such decision in New Jersey and one would hope that the philosophy of fairness it
espouses will be formalized either by legislative action or an appropriate rule promulgated
by the Director of the Division of Administrative Procedure. No appeal has yet been filed.
65 Editorial, 92 N.J.L.J. 52 (1969), wherein the Administrative Procedure Act, absent
the provision suggested in this comment, is hailed as a great stride forward.

